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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
At common law, one spouse could not sue the other in tort because hus-
band and wife were considered as one person. Statutes, known as "Married
Women's Acts," have been passed in all jurisdictions in this country. In
general, they allow a wife to sue as if unmarried and to hold property in her
own right.5 Courts in the majority of states have said that these statutes
did not alter the common law view barring suits between husband and wife
for personal torts.6 Ohio appellate courts followed this view.'
In the principal case, however, the Ohio Supreme Court said:" The
statutory provisions evince a clear purpose to eliminate the barriers erected
by the common law " Ohio, in following the minority view, continues
the liberal tendency of Signs v. SignsY
STANLEY WIENER
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS - TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
The plaintiff in an action for alimony and separate maintenance re-
quested temporary injunctions against her husband and another woman to
restrain them from "visiting, conversing socially, associating, or meeting,
with each other during the statutory1 six-week waiting period between is-
suance of summons in the action and hearing of the case on its merits. The
court overruled the defendants' demurrers and enjoined both defendants as
N.W 526 (1932); Courtney v. Courmey, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938).
See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 619-624, 31 S.Ct. 111, 113-114 (1910).
' PRossER, TORTS 898 (1941).
'E.g. OHio GEN. CODE §§ 8002-1to8002-8. See also OHo GEN. CODE §§ 11245,
11591. See also OHIO CONST. Art. L, § 16.
'Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 S.Ct. 111 (1910); Austin v. Austin,
136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d
1084 (1933); Fehr v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corporation, 246 Wis.
228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944)
'Tanno v. Eby, 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N.E.2d 813 (1946); Wirrig v. Hatter, 29
Ohio L. Abs. 587 (1939); Finn v. Finn, 19 Ohio App. 302 (1924)
The court in Leonardi v. Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 110, 117, 153 N.E. 93, 95
(1925) stated: "None of the sections of the General Code from 7995 to 8004
clearly expresses the intention on the part of the Legislature to abrogate the com-
mon law principle that a married woman cannot maintain an action against her
husband for a personal injury caused by his neglect; nor does section 11245, Gen-
eral Code, do so. Until the Legislature does so express its intentions, the wife cannot
maintain an action against her husband to recover damages for a personal injury
caused by his negligent act."
'Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 116, -N.E.2d- (1952).
'156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952). Discussed in W.R.U. LAW REV.
p. 80 supra. "In that case the court refused to follow the rule adopted in the majority
of the states that actions are not permissible between parent and minor child for
personal torts and recognized instead the tendency of modern decisions to liberalize
the rule." Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 118, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952).
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RECENT DECISIONS
requested, for the purpose of furthering reconciliation between the husband
and wife by protecting the marital status during the pendency of the action.2
In a majority of jurisdictions in which the question has arisen, the courts
have refused to grant an injunction to prevent a third party from alienating
the affections of a spouse. In one jurisdiction injunctive relief was denied
on the ground that the right to be protected is not a property right; there-
fore, equity can have no jurisdicuona One court held that the injunction
should be refused because the decree sought would impose an unfair restric-
non upon the personal liberty of the defendant by denying him the normal
social intercourse of talking to and associating with the plaintiff's spouse4
Three courts reasoned that injunctive relief should be refused because the
decree would be too difficult to enforce, and because the injunction would
be of little or no benefit in aiding in the reconciliation of husband and
wife." In two cases, the courts held that the plaintiff in seeking a decree for
separate maintenance or divorce was, in effect, estopped from invoking
equity's jurisdiction for the injunction."
Courts of two jurisdictions have allowed injunctions to prevent a third
party from alienating the affections of the plaintiff's spouse These courts
held that equity has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action and in
a proper case is not powerless to aid in reconciliation of husband and wife
by injunctive decree.
"An action for divorce or alimony may not be heard and decided until after the ex-
piration of six weeks from the service of summons or the first publication of notice."
OIo GENERAL CODE § 8003-10 (1951).
'Pashko v. Pashko, 101 N.E.2d 804 (Cuyahoga Corn. PI. 1951).
'Bank v. Bank, 180 Md. 254, 23 A.2d 700 (1942). Equity's traditional limitation
on its jurisdiction to the protection of property rights stems from a dictum of Lord
Eldon in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 413 (1818). However, courts of equity
have always protected some rights of personality under the guse of "property" rights,
and the modern trend is toward a more extensive and franker protection of non-
property rights. See Chafee, The Progress of the Law -Equitable Relief against
Torts, 34 HARv. L. REv. 388 (1921); Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Per-
sonal Rights, 33 YALE L J. 115 (1923); Moreland, Injunctve Control of Family
Relations, 18 KY. LJ. 207 (1930); Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and
Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916); Simpson, Fifty Years of
American Equity, 50 HARV. L REv. 640 (1936); Theobald, Does Equity Protect
Property Rights sn Domestic Relations, 19 Ky. LJ. 57 (1930).
' Snedaker v. King, 111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924).
'White v. Thomson, 324 Mass. 140, 85 N.E.2d 246 (1949); Hadley v. Hadley,
323 Mich. 555, 36 N.W.2d 144 (1949); Snedaker v. King, supra note 4.
'Pearce v. Pearce, 37 Wash.2d 918, 226 P.2d 895 (1951) (temporary injunction
for period between interlocutory and final divorce decrees); Knighton v. Knighton,
252 Ala. 520, 41 So. 2d 172 (1949) (permanent injunction in an action for sep-
arate maintenance). Pearce v. Pearce may be distinguished from the principal case
on the ground that the plaintiff requested a complete severing of the marriage bonds
by a divorce action.
'Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 So.2d 852 (1942); Smith v. Womack, 271
S.W 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Witte v. Bauderer, 255 S.W 1016 (Tex. Civ.
1952]
